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Numbers 11. Reports of Major General Peter J. Osterhaus, U. S. Army, Commanding Fifteenth Army Corps. HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Savannah, Ga., December 26, 1864.

CAPTAIN:

The orders issued regulating the march of the columns from Atlanta south assigned me again to the extreme right, with the privilege of using one or more parallel roads, if it did not interfere with the columns on my left (Seventeenth Army Corps). I respectfully refer the major-General commanding to the accompanying map,+ marked B, for the routes taken by and the camps of the different divisions at the end of every day's march.

On November 15, 1864, in pursuance of orders received, the Fifteenth Army Corps left its encampments-General Woods, Smith, and Hazen, marching in one column from Atlanta, arrived, via Rough and Ready, in the vicinity of Stockbridge; General Corse, who had on the previous night reached the Chattahoochee River, was necessarily delayed at Atlanta, receiving and issuing quartermaster's stores, which were laid a Part of them, and therefore had to halt for the night in the vicinity of Rough and Ready. The head of the former columns (First, Second, and Third Divisions) found near the aforesaid railroad station some rebel pickets, who, evidently surprised at our unexpected appearance, fled. Near Stockbridge the rebel General, Lewis, with about 1,000 mounted troops and one section of artillery, held a position, but he also yielded it after a very feeble show of resistance. This rebel general subsequently indulged merely in the destruction of bridges to oppose our advance, keeping his troops at a very discreet distance. The First, Second, and Third Divisions were encamped in the vicinity of Stockbridge, with a view to prevent a collision with the Seventeenth Army Corps, whose march was also directed toward Stockbridge.

McDonough being the point to be reached on the 16th of November, I directed General Hazen (Second Division) to march on the main road via Stockbridge, while Generals Woods and Smith moved via Lee's Mills, and General Corse was to take a direct road from his camp at Rough and Ready, by Lee's Mills, to McDonough. At McDonough the whole of the Fifteenth Army Corps was for the first time assembled, and the divisions in supporting distance of each other.

The corps marched on November 17 in one column to Locust Grove, where, to facilitate the movement, two columns were formed, moving toward Planters' Factory, on the Ocmulgee River-Generals Woods and Hazen via Indian Springs, Generals Smith and Corse via Jackson. On the same day I succeeded in pushing the Twenty-ninth Missouri Infantry to that river, and secured both banks for the intended bridges. As soon as the pontoon could be laid down at the Ocmulgee Factories, General Smith crossed and took a defensive position on the east side of the Ocmulgee (November 18), the other divisions of the corps remaining in their respective camps until the Seventeenth Corps had crossed.

At 7. 30 a. m. November 19 the Seventeenth Corps yielded the bridge to us and we commenced crossing, General Hazen leading. General Smith had previously received orders to march on the direct road to Hillsborough, Generals Hazen and Woods were to follow Smith, while General Corse, who brought up the rear, had orders to march, via Monticello, to Hillsborough. This general was also directed to destroy, before leaving the west bank of the Ocmulgee, the cotton factory, &c., which had been used for military purposes by the rebel Government. Rain, very bad roads, and the long trains of the whole Army of the Tennessee, including those of the cavalry, and the pontoon trains and some 4,000 head of beef-cattle, delayed General Corse considerably. His rear could not leave the river before next morning (November 20), and he could march only as far as Monticello, while Woods, Smith, and Hazen reached the vicinity of Clinton that day. General Kilpatrick's cavalry had preceded us to that place and left on our arrival for Macon. Some rebel cavalry kept hovering around Clinton, and repeatedly attacked our pickets without making any impression.

Early on the morning of November 21 I pushed the Twenty-ninth Missouri (mounted) toward the Macon railroad, with orders to destroy the track, and thus prevent the further use of the road for military purposes. Colonel Gage struck and broke the road at 10 a. m. General Smith's division marched the same day from Clinton on the direct road toward Gordon, while Woods and Hazen moved toward Irwinton. A large force of the enemy being reported at Griswoldville, near which place the outer column (Generals Woods and Hazen) had to pass, it was considered prudent to move only the most necessary trains (ordnance) with this exposed column, and give the bulk of the trains, in charge of General Smith, the inner route. The divisions of Woods and Hazen camped for the night in supporting distance of each other near the Macon railroad. The enemy's showed, notwithstanding the presence of the large cavalry force of General Kilpatrick, some temerity, and attacked the column of Woods several times. As it appeared impossible for General Corse's division, with the incumbrances clogging his movements, to reach Clinton in time on November 21 to secure that place against rebel assault, I ordered a brigade of Hazen's division (Colonel Theodore Jones) to remain there until the arrival of General Corse. Colonel Jones was constantly annoyed by rebel cavalry. When General Corse came up on next day, he considered the remaining of Colonel Jones most desirable, and this zealous officer therefore held his position until all and everything had safely gone by this point of danger, and then followed General Corse on the direct road to Gordon.

Your orders for the 22nd of November were to make a demonstration against Griswoldville, while our trains were to be pushed on toward Gordon with all the dispatch the terrible condition of the rutted roads permitted. I consequently ordered one brigade (General Walcutt's) of General Wood's division to move early on the south side of the railroad in the direction of Griswoldville. When I joined General Walcutt to accompany the expedition, Iof General Kilpatrick's in his front, and a portion of it, which had tried to drive back the rebel advance line, had just come back without having succeeded. General Walcutt was ordered at once to relieve the cavalry, and the advance was sounded. A strong line of skirmishers, supported by two regiments and some cavalry, which General Kilpatrick had kindly furnished, soon struck the rebels, who were in line behind a creek, or rather swamp, in an open pine land, and caused them, with that peculiar spirit of our troops, to look for their horses and run. General Walcutt kept pushing forward, and his men pursued in double-quick with cheers and laughter the fleeing horsemen, waded the creek, marched through the belt of timber beyond until they reached an open prairie like field, which was in possession of large rebel cavalry forces. General Walcutt halted here just long enough to correct his line, caution his skirmishers and supports to be prepared for a cavalry dash, and then they emerged into the open field and made for the rebels, who, throwing away the best chance that can be desired by an intrepid cavalry, fled in confusion. General Walcutt followed rapidly, capturing many horses, equipments, &c. When beyond Griswoldville the rebels, who were commanded by General Wheeler in person, took different roads; and as I had some knowledge of Wheeler's way of maneuvering- which is not formidable in the dash of arms, but sometimes successful by great activity and circumspection-I ordered General Woods to have General Walcutt's command rallied and take a defensive position near the open field mentioned above. The position selected was in the edge of the timber and along a slight rise in the ground, at the base of which a kind of marshy swamp formed a natural obstruction to the approach; the right and left of the position was pretty well secured by swamps, &c. Light breast-works, built of rails, were put up to cover our men, and a section of artillery of Captain Arndt's (First Michigan) battery was ordered there. These preparations were considered sufficient to meet any of General Wheeler's reconnaissances, which he might undertake after finding out that he was no longer pressed, but had to stand a more severe trial. In the afternoon the rebel commander brought forward four brigades of infantry and a battery of artillery, supported by a strong cavalry force, to dislodge General Walcutt from his position. For several hours their attempts were repeated with the greatest impetuosity. Their artillery threw a terrific fire into the frail works of Walcutt, while their columns of infantry marched in heroic style to within fifty yards of our line. It was all in vain! Walcutt and his brave brigade proved that superior skill, coolness, and valor made up for the great disparity in numbers. When night came the enemy retired, leaving over 300 dead on the battle-field and a number of wounded, who were taken care of by our medical corps; also a number of prisoners were taken. Our loss was comparatively light. The brave General Walcutt was wounded by a piece of shell during the fight, and Colonel Catterson assumed the command of the brigade.

During these operations at Griswoldville the division of General Hazen had passed behind General Woods and taken a defensive position in his support two miles south of Gordon. General Smith entered Gordon and General Corse passed by Clinton. A portion of General Woods' command during the day was employed in destroying the railroad track from Griswoldville to within three miles of Gordon, and General Smith, immediately after his arrival, put his men to work to meet General Woods' parties. General Smith finished the work of destruction in the next two days.

General Hazen advanced on the 23rd within seven miles of Irwinton, and Woods intrenched a line south of Gordon commanding all the approaches from the west and south. Both divisions marched the following day to Irwinton. At last, on November 24, General Corse's division and the brigade of Second Division (Colonel Jones) arrived with all the trains at Gordon, relieving us of a great deal of anxiety. These officers the highest credit for their faithful execution of orders under difficulties almost insurmountable. They brought a train of many hundred wagons fifty miles and over roads whose condition beggars all description. General Corse encamped for the night in the position vacated by General Woods; Colonel Jones joined his division. The corps was to cross Oconee River, at Ball's Ferry, consequently the four divisions marched early on November 25 from their respective camps toward that point. Hazen and Woods arrived at the ferry; Corse and Smith at Milton and Irwinton, respectively. In order to protect the right flank of our column during its crossing of the river against some rebel fo be at Big Sandy Creek, the Twenty-ninth Missouri (mounted) was stationed along that stream, with orders to destroy all bridges and guard all such points where crossing could be effected. They found some opposition at the Light Wood Knot bridge, but succeeded in destroying it, notwithstanding. When I arrived at the Oconee I found there the First Alabama Cavalry, who reported the enemy in position on the east bank. A reconnaissance confirmed the report; but their number was apparently small, and, perceiving that we were preparing in earnest to force a crossing, they left during the night.

Bridges were laid in the morning of November 26, and the corps crossed in the following order: Corse, Woods, Hazen, and Smith. The latter general had orders to remain until the bridge was taken up and the trains all on the way. The two leading divisions marched the same afternoon to Irwin's Cross-Roads, and from there three brigades were detailed on next morning to destroy the Savannah railroad to Station Numbers 13. The remaining brigades and trains of these divisions (Woods' and Corse's) marched the afternoon (November 27) on the Augusta dirt road to the intersection of the Savannah dirt road, with orders to proceed, on November 28, on the latter road, to a point near railroad station Numbers 11, and there meet the divisions of Generals Smith and Hazen. These divisions came to Irwin's Cross-Roads on the morning of November 27, and I intended to march with them on next day, by plantation roads, to the point of meeting; consequently all the divisions of the corps encamped the next night (November 28) in supporting distance and within seven miles of Station 11.

On November 29 Woods and Corse followed a very dim road (called the Democrat road) to its intersection with the Swainsborough and old Savannah road. The divisions of Hazen and Smith marched on the main Sandersville and Savannah road until they struck, one mile south of Station Numbers 11, the Seventeenth Army Corps, who had the right of way. The ground permitting, I ordered a parallel road to be cut for about two miles to a fork which led into a road that ran parallel to that taken by Woods and Corse. The country here is almost a perfect wilderness-long-leaved pines cover the poor sandy soil but sparely, marsh, lined with narrow skirts of shrub-like undergrowth, breaks this monitory; but what makes the soil almost worthless for agricultural purposes rendered it favorable to our operations. An energetic corps of axmen to corduroy roads across the creeks and marshes opens in a short time enough space for any number of columns. On November 30, when we marched toward the little town of Summerville, the Second, Third, and Fourth Divisions moved part of the way abreast of each other. Generals Woods and Corse reached that day a point within three miles and a half of railroad station Numbers 9 1/2. Generals Hazen and Smith halted at Summerville. As the accompanying map* shows, there are two roads running substantially parallel to and south of the Ogeechee River and the Savannah railroad; they unite opposite Station Numbers 2. Both roads were represented practicable, and consequently the corps was divided into two columns-Hazen and Smith were to march from Summerville, via Statesborough, to Numbers 2; the left column (Woods and Corse) on the inter route. I took care to regulate the marches daily, so as to have the columns always in supporting distance, and used a portion of the Twenty-ninth Missouri (mounted) to keep up communication and explore the intermediate ground between the columns. The two columns crossed Scull's Creek on December 2, and were ordered to lie over on December 3, to give the columns to our left time to come up with us. The troops of these columns were partly employed in breading the railroad, and in order to assist this work, detachments of General Woods' troops had crossed the Ogeechee, at Green's Bridge, on December 1 (which we had to repair), and burnt the railroad in the vicinity of Station Numbers 8.

Next day (December 2) a pontoon was ordered to be laid opposite Station Numbers 7, and large portions of the divisions of General Corse and Woods put to work destroying the railroad there, which they did most effectually for many miles. On the 4th and 5th of December the two columns continued their routes, bringing the left column opposite Guyton (Station Numbers 3), while the right column camped about four miles off on the headwaters of Black Creek, December 5. General Hazen, who led the right column, fell in on both days with a force of General Wheeler's cavalry; after a lively skirmish at Statesborough, the rebels dispersed and did not make their appearance any more. The next day the corps had to lie over again; but very early in the morning I pushed the Twenty-ninth Missouri forward to secure the crossing of the Ogeechee River, near Station Numbers 2 (at Wright's and Jenks' Bridges). We found the bridges burnt. I ordered at once a foot bridge to be constructed on the remains of Wright's Bridge, and directed General Woods to send one brigade to the bridge and hold it. The commanding officer of the brigade (Colonel Williamson) threw a regiment across the Ogeechee, and constructed on the east side breast-works, and then pushed a detachment of fifty men, under Captain McSweeney (Ninth Iowa), to the railroad with orders to break it, and thus prevent the enemy from re-enforcing his troops, who opposed the advance of the columns on the east side of the river. Captain McSweeney moved directly for the railroad about two miles off and broke it in plain view of a train coming down loaded with troops. He then fell back pursued by the rebels, but he kept them in check. When in the evening the enemy attempted to drive Colonel Williamson's men from the breast-works thrown up in the afternoon, he was repulsed with some loss. Our appearance on the flank of the rebels drew their attention to the lower crossing, and they sent a detachment of infantry to Jenks' Bridge, three miles below Wright's.

The next morning (December 7) the divisions of Generals Woods. Smith, and Corse were concentrated near Jenks' Bridge. General Hazen was ordered to send, by way of a diversion, the brigade of Colonel Oliver, which had been pushed on the day previous toward Jenks' Bridge, to the Cannouchee and take possession of the bridge near Bryan Court-House; with the rest of his command General Hazen was to follow Colonel Oliver's brigade as far as Black Creek. When Colonel Oliver withdrew in the morning from Jenks' Bridge he left the Ninetieth Illinois (Colonel Stuart) there to watch the rebels on the east side of the river. General Corse on his arrival at Jenks' Bridge found Colonel Stuart behind a line of rifle-pits, livelily disputing the crossing. To re-enforce Colonel Stuart one section of Arndt's battery was brought into position and opened. They succeeded in keeping the rebels under cover while some pontoons were launched, and, manned by the Ninetieth Illinois (Colonel Stuart), crossed the river. As soon as boat-load of men got a foothold on the other bank the rebels fell back to a line of works at the eastern extremity of a long dam or levee, which formed the connection across the swamp between the river and the high land. The dam is about half a mile long. Our pontoniers could lay the bridge without being molested any further. While this cork was going on and the flood-bridges in the dam were repaired, General Corse crossed a portion of his command in boats, and they worked their way through the swamp and the thick woods toward the rebel position. To facilitate their dislodgment General Woods was ordered early in the morning to push Colonel Williamson's whole brigade across Wright's Bridge above and try to strike the enemy's flank. When the pontoons were laid I ordered the advance. The Second Iowa Infantry, of General Rice's brigade (Corse's division), confronted the rebels. They moved up in very good style, pushing sharply on the enemy's wings, and forced them very soon to make for their support, which was intrenched in double line on an elevation where the road from Jenks' Bridge crosses at right angles the Wright's Bridge road. Colonel Williamson's brigade was advancing on the latter road. When I had cause to believe this column in supporting distance, I directed General Rice to attack the rebels in their breast-works. The Second Iowa rushed up to them over an open plain and carried the works, killing and wounding a number and capturing about thirty prisoners. Colonel Williamson arrived at the moment the works were taken, and he dispatched some companies to the railroad, while General Rice advanced on a parallel road to the station. The enemy fled. A portion of Corse's division was stationed at the railroad station, while the remainder of the division and Colonel Williamson's brigade intrenched and occupied a line at the cross-roads mentioned above.

In the evening (December 7) General Hazen reported that Colonel Oliver had arrived at the Cannouchee, but found the bridge partly burnt and strongly defended. The crossing of the river was deemed essential in order to destroy the Gulf railroad, which was largely used by the rebel authorities at Savannah. Under orders from headquarters Department and Army of the Tennessee I moved next morning (December 8) toward Cannouchee River with General Hazen's division and that of General Woods', except Williamson's brigade, which was to occupy Station Numbers 2 until the arrival of the Seventeenth Army Corps. After reconnoitering the Cannouchee River I brought, however, only General Hazen's division to the bridge near Bryan Court-House, halting Woods' four miles north of it at the forks of the road to Fort Argyle. The enemy's position on the south side of the Cannouchee was naturally very strong. Wide, impassible swamps line both sides of that stream, and there are but very few points where a crossing is practicable. There is none below Bryan Court-House, and parties sent twelve miles upstream could not learn of another above. From the Court-House a good road leads to the bridge, but an impenetrable live-oak swamp is on the other side of it. A levee and three bridges, of an aggregate length of 800 feet, lead through the swamp to the highland; the levee and bridges were swept by a section of artillery and by infantry covered by breast-works. I was, however, informed that there had been an old ferry below the bridge, and thus I hoped to be able to effect a crossing there if the exact spot could be found. By minute inspection of the banks during the night the landing of the old ferry was detected, and an expedition sent in a boat across the river struck high ground and a rebel picket. Our men fired and created the greatest alarm in the rebel camp. They opened with infantry and artillery most vigorously, and, to my astonishment, they left the position by 2 a. m.

The next morning (December 9) showed that the contemplated crossing at the old ferry, which the rebels could not prevent, would have exposed their flanks, and, therefore, their sudden departure. Troops were crossed as fast as possible in boats, while the damaged bridge was being repaired. I ordered General Hazen to send two of his brigades to the railroad, which was in full work yet. One brigade marched toward King's Bridge and Way's Station, the other to Fleming Station; both with orders to destroy the road as effectually as possible. (This work of destruction was afterward completed and extended for twenty miles by General Hazen.) The remaining brigade was placed in reserve at the bridge. The expeditionary brigades returned during the night from their work at the railroad, having, with the assistance of the Twenty-ninth Missouri (mounted), driven everything from the road and taken some prisoners.

On the morning of December 8 General Smith was left in charge of the trains corralled at Jenks' Bridge (west side), and General Corse, who was on the east side of the Ogeechee River, moved his division down the stream toward Dillon's Bridge, which he found burned, however, and had to be replaced by pontoons. On the following day (9th) the general pushed on and met some rebels at the Savannah Canal and drove them back to their main line, which he assaulted and carried, taking 1 piece of rifled artillery and some 60 prisoners. General Corse's report was laid before you, and I respectfully refer to it for the particulars of this brilliant affair. General Corse followed the rebels across Little Ogeechee and to the north fork of it; but was recalled by General Howard behind the Ogeechee, where he threw up a line of defense. General Smith, with the trains of the Third and Fourth Division, moved to the canal, and, early on the morning of December 10, from there up the towpath along the canal (south side) abreast of General Corse, who advanced again beyond the Little Ogeechee on the Savannah road.

I left, on December 10, General Hazen, with orders to march by way of a foot bridge constructed at Dilton's Ferry to the support of Corse, while General Woods, with the trains of the First and Second Divisions, moved across the Ogeechee River by the pontoon bridge near Dillon's and closed on Smith's division (the trains were to be left at the canal). General Corse's advance, which I had joined, found no opposition west of the north fork; but behind that stream, which is rather a wide swamp subject to the influence of the tides, the rebel fortifications and camps were stretched out. The rebel troops gathered on and behind the parapets, and with their banners defiantly unfurled awaited the approach of our column. The open and exposed ground, swamps, and stream in front of the rebel works forbade all sudden attacks, an advance were kept accordingly under cover, while skirmishers probed all along the lines as closely and carefully as possible. I ordered Captain De Gres' 20-pounder Parrott battery to be brought forward in a position from which it could throw an oblique fire into their main works, which covered the Savannah road, without coming under fire of the rebel batteries. With wonted precision De Gress landed his shots and created great commotion in the garrison. The profiles of the works and the traverses were too heavy, however to inflict any serious damage. A section of Battery H, First Missouri Artillery, opened from an advanced position near the Savannah road, covered only by some trees. It caused the rebels to open at once with six guns and great vehemence; so much so, that it was not considered prudent on our side to continue the fire. The troops of the four divisions were before night in the positions assigned to them and encamped just out of range of the enemy's artillery. In pursuance of orders received during the night, the Fifteenth Army Corps was to occupy the ground on the right of the Savannah road, and accordingly in the morning of the 11th of December General Corse shifted to the right and as near the Gulf railroad as the march would permit. Woods occupying ground between Corse's left and the Savannah road. General Hazen camped a cheval of the road about two miles in the rear of the front divisions, and General Smith moved to Station Numbers 1, on the Gulf railroad, pushing his pickets forward on that road and to the right to cover the approaches from the south. These movements were very difficult to execute owing to the rain which had converted the road through the marshy soil into a sea of mud and quagmire. To prevent serious delays hereafter I ordered the pioneers at once to construct a double corduroy track from our front to the rear.

On the 12th of December I sent, on the General's order, a section of 20-pounder Parrotts and the Twenty-seventh Missouri Infantry (General Woods' division) to Cheves' rice mill, to assist in some movement against Fort McAllister; and in the night the division of General Hazen, with Battery H, First Missouri Artillery, and the remaining section of De Gress' 20-pounder Parrotts, were ordered to march very early on the 13th, via King's Bridge, to the aforesaid fort and take it. Fort McAllister was very strong and apparently well garrisoned. General Hazen arrived before it at 2 o'clock, and at 3. 45 p. m. he had completed his arrangements for the assault. They proved to be in keeping with that noble soldier. When the advance sounded the brave men rushed through a line of torpedoes and heavy abatis, jumped into the wide and deep ditch, and climbed in one heroic elan, which secured them the fort after a few minutes' struggle, but not without a heavy loss, mostly occasioned by the explosion of the torpedoes. Twenty-three siege and field guns and 215 men, the entire garrison, were the immediate prize of the capture; but the most important feature of this victory was that it opened communication with the fleet and thus furnished to our armies the necessary supplies, and put beyond doubt the final capture of Savannah, whose garrison and inhabitants were, according to all information, but scantly supplied. The Second Division garrisoned the captured fort. The artillery was ordered back to take a part in the preparation for the contemplated assault on the Ogeechee lines, as General Hardee, the commander of the rebel forces in Savannah, had refused, on December 17, to surrender. Generals Woods and Corse since December 13 had steadily pushed their line forward and were in close proximity to the rebel works. All points which offered a chance for crossing the swamps and the river between our and the rebel works were looked up and most carefully studied; in fact, everything was done to complete our knowledge of the difficult ground before us. I caused a number of substantial batteries to be thrown up. In selecting the sites for these the principal attention was paid to the rebel fort on the Savannah road, where they had a number of heavy siege pieces in position, and which they undoubtedly considered the key of their whole line. The rebels had also a number of batteries farther to their left, and their fire annoyed Generals Smith's and Corse's lines to some extent; however, the guns used in these batteries were light field pieces, and it appeared that the enemy thought their left sufficiently secured by the natural obstructions; at least, its lines of infantry there were weak, and I did not wish to disturb this belief by an ostentatious display of activity. The ground on our side was covered with timber, and thus permitted us to prepare for any operations that might become desirable in perfect concealment.

On the 19th of December I received your ordersything for an assault on December 21. The closest investigation of the ground before us showed that the stream could be crossed in two places (in addition of the Savannah road), where it is but very narrow and the approaches to it practicable. One of these points was in General Woods', the other in General Corse's front. Both places never had drawn the enemy's attention, and parties of General Woods and General Corse had gone across in boats without being observed by the rebels. Trestles were built and pontoon-boats gotten ready; the rifle-pits were pushed within 150 to 200 yards of the rebel works. Major Stolbrand, chief of artillery, brought ten pieces of artillery on and to the left of the Savannah road, keeping the remaining eight pieces in reserve, and in a convenient place where they could be ordered to any point where the contemplated attack might demand them. On the morning of December 20 an impression was created that the rebels were withdrawing their pieces from the fort on the Savannah road. To prevent such an undertaking I ordered Captain Zickrick (Twelfth Wisconsin) on the Savannah road battery and Captain Arndt on the Cemetery battery to open on the fort. Their practice was splendid. The enemy, who, after considerable work, succeeded in opening his heavy batteries, had to cease firing very soon under the terrific accuracy of our guns. General Woods' advanced line of infantry, which was rather less than 150 yards from the rebel main line, kept the enemy's sharpshooters completely silent and behind their breast-works. This morning's experience gratified the best hope of a successful assault in the coming night, but orders from General Sherman postponed the attack. During the night of the 20th General Woods' pickets kept the enemy closely under their control, always fearing they would get away. Their fears were correct. Leaving their guns and ammunition in the fort, the rebels sneaked away in the darkness of the night, and the Sixth Iowa Infantry entered, before daylight, their fortifications. Savannah was ours. It proved the richest capture of the war. In my immediate front on the Little Ogeechee and in the portion of the lines around Savannah, which was assigned to the Fifteenth Army Corps on the morning of 21st of December, forty-seven guns, with all ammunition, were found, not counting in the armament at McAllister.

In order to recapitulate, I state that since October 4 to December 21, the Fifteenth Army Corps had marched, in forty-six actual marching days, 684 miles; cut, corduroyed, and otherwise constructed thirty-two miles of road, and built 1,502 yards of bridge; while it destroyed most effectually over 60 miles of railroad. Being on an exposed flank, the corps had a large share of the fighting during the campaign, and the actions at Allatoona, Griswoldville, and McAllister will shine as bright stars in the record of the corps.

Our losses in battle were comparatively light, and I am happy to state that, thanks to the very efficient and skillful medical corps under the direction of Doctor Niccolls, surgeons of volunteers, not a single man of our wounded was left behind and given up to the mercies of a prejudiced enemy. All those poor sufferers came with us through the wilderness of Georgia, and are all doing well. It is a consoling thought that even the remains of those noble martyrs are resting in soil which soon will be redeemed from treason and become our country once more. Lists of casualties have been forwarded.

Notwithstanding we were dependent on the country for the subsistence for men and beasts, and large numbers of forages were necessarily and constantly at large, the system adopted to regulate these parties was efficient enough even in the face of ubiquitous rebel cavalry on our flanks. The troops and animals were more than amply supplied. At times the men fared luxuriously; and while but very few of our men were taken prisoners, our foraging parties captured a considerable number of rebel officer and soldiers; in one instance they secured the bearer of important dispatches from General Hardee to General Wheeler.

I cannot look back on this campaign without feeling under the greatest obligations to the officers under my command. With the assistance of Generals Woods, Hazen, Smith, and Corse, there are but few things which cannot be achieved by such officers and men as the Fifteenth Army Corps is composed of. I had occasion before this to bring the services of the above generals, and of General Walcutt and other ofly to the notice of the major-General commanding the army. I here beg to express my high admiration of them.

My thanks are due to the officers of my staff, namely: Colonel Fort, chief quartermaster; Colonel Carpenter, chief commissary of subsistence; Major Gordon; acting senior aide-de-camp; Major Woodworth, medical inspector; Major Gillette, provost-marshal; Captains Whitehead and Wheeler, assistant adjutant-General; Captain Hubbard, acting aide-de-camp; Captain Perkins, acting assistant inspector-General; Lieutenant Dickey, commissary of musters; Lieutenant Perry, acting aide-de-camp; and Lieutenant Mitchell, ordnance officer. They performed their arduous duties with great zeal and proved to be reliable soldiers.

To Major Stolbrand I have to acknowledge important services during the campaign as chief of artillery of the corps. Through his energy and skill that branch of the arms which was under his immediate care was in most excellent condition.

Captain Klostermann, the acting chief engineer, filled the position with marked ability. He did most valuable services in exploring roads through the virgin forests of Johnson, Emanuel, Bolloch, and Bryant Counties, where for miles and miles there in so guide or landmark, and the compass his sole reliance.

I respectfully refer to the inclosed reports of my subordinate commanders.

I remain, your most obedient servant,

P. JOS. OSTERHAUS,

Major-General, U. S. Volunteers.

Captain SAMUEL L. TAGGART,

Asst. Adjt. General, Department and Army of the Tennessee.